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Abstract
Nearly fifteen years ago, Google unveiled the generalized second price (GSP) auction. By
all theoretical accounts including their own [28], this was the wrong auction — the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction would have been the proper choice — yet GSP has succeeded
spectacularly.
We give a deep justification for GSP’s success: advertisers’ preferences map to a model we
call value maximization; they do not maximize profit as the standard theory would believe. For
value maximizers, GSP is the truthful auction [4]. Moreover, this implies an axiomatization
of GSP — it is an auction whose prices are truthful for value maximizers — that can be
applied much more broadly than the simple model for which GSP was originally designed. In
particular, applying it to arbitrary single-parameter domains recovers the folklore definition of
GSP. Through the lens of value maximization, GSP metamorphosizes into a powerful auction,
sound in its principles and elegant in its simplicity.
1 Introduction
In February 2002, Google launched its pay-per-click AdWords auction with an innovation that would
change the industry: while competitors used a first price model to sell ads on a search results page,1
Google chose a second price paradigm [28]. The benefits were clear [16], and within 5 years, the
search ads industry had standardized on Google’s generalized second price (GSP) auction. There
was one problem with GSP: it was not the proper generalization of Vickrey’s second price auction,
a title that instead belongs to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Google realized this
mere months after launch, yet GSP was already humming along, too entrenched to be replaced [28].
By all reasonable accounts GSP has thrived, much to the consternation of the research com-
munity. Our collective first response was simply “it can’t be too bad:” revenue and welfare in
reasonable equilibria are no worse than VCG [27, 17]. Many studies of GSP followed — a more
recent justification falls out of GSP’s simplicity: GSP pricing is independent of the likelihood that
∗A preliminary work “On the Truthfulness of GSP” [12] was presented at the 11th Ad Auctions Workshop and
covered a number of results in this paper.
†Yahoo Research, Sunnyvale, CA
‡Yahoo Research, New York, NY
§Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. Part of this work was done while the author was an intern at Yahoo.
1Overture.com, formerly GoTo.com and later bought by Yahoo, introduced the first sponsored search auctions in
1996 and was still the dominant player in 2002. Their auction had pay-your-bid pricing that has since been dubbed
the generalized first price auction (GFP).
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the user clicks on an ad,2 so GSP’s equilibrium guarantees are immune to errors in click model-
ing [22, 15]. Yet, throughout these and many other results, the community’s implicit perspective
has remained constant: GSP is an ugly duckling that requires continual excuses.
We turn past analysis on its head and propose that GSP’s runaway success follows from a much
simpler explanation: GSP is truthful. Of course, it is well-known that VCG is truthful for profit
maximizers. In reality, advertisers rarely optimize for profit, and, as we will discus, their goals and
behavior are much closer to a model we call value maximization. In fact, it is quite easy to see that
GSP is truthful for this class of bidders — Aggarwal et al. [4] note exactly this in the limiting case
of a general preference model — the challenge is to argue that advertisers’ preferences generally
fit our value maximizing model, which we do in two ways. First we argue based on advertisers’
traditional objectives that the value maximizing model is the right minimal theoretical model.
Second, we prove and empirically validate that any bidder with a moderate ROI constraint will
behave equivalently to a value maximizer, making value maximization a robust choice for fitting
advertiser preferences.
Moreover, our work suggests a fundamental axiomatic definition of GSP: it is the auction that
maximizes the sum of advertisers’ values and charges prices truthful for value maximizers. This is
the first work that gives a rigorous foundation to (e.g.) generalize GSP when search ads outgrow
their current model. In doing so, we justify the folklore definition that the GSP price is the minimum
bid required to maintain the same allocation.
Through these results, we develop a new appreciation for GSP. It gains sound theoretical footing
as a truthful auction, magnified by the fact that value maximizing preferences can be justified in
multiple ways. This virtue is heightened by its elegant simplicity, making it a veritable Cinderella
— the wrong auction that turned out to be just right.
1.1 Preferences of Online Advertisers
Advertisers can be split into two categories: brand and performance. Brand advertisers target long-
term growth and awareness. Their goal is to reach as many people as possible, generate as many
clicks as possible, capture as much market share as possible, generate as much revenue as possible,
and so on. In contrast, performance advertisers care about immediate results. They optimize for
the sales, sign-ups, or other so-called conversions generated directly from their ads.
Preferences of Brand Advertisers Brand advertisers come to a marketplace with explicit
objectives. They typically have a mandate to meet a specific business goal — showing impressions
to an audience, generating clicks, or maximizing revenue — driven by long-term considerations
instead of immediate profit. Thus cost, while important, merely enters their preferences as a
constraint — brand advertisers will have a budget and limits on what they are willing to pay on
average for an impression/click/conversion, but otherwise directly optimize for their mandate.
Preferences of Performance Advetisers Performance advertisers optimize the immediate
tradeoff between value and cost. Return on investment (ROI) has been the standard metric for
measuring this tradeoff across all types of advertising for decades. ROI measures the ratio of the
2Technically, the “ad effect” term in the click probability appears in both the optimization and pricing, but these
can be thought of as bidder weights; analysis of GSP’s equilibria does not require that they are accurate. This
simplicity also makes implementation easier and is a practical reason GSP is common.
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profit obtained (“return”) to the cost or price paid (“investment”), i.e., the density of profit in cost:
ROI =
Value-Price
Price
=
Profit
Price
Being a density metric, unconstrained maximization of ROI is not sensible;3 instead, advertisers
come with an ROI constraint and optimize (e.g. maximize revenue and/or clicks). For example,
the following story plays out regularly at Yahoo:
1. Advertiser X designates a small budget for testing a Yahoo advertising product.
2. Advertiser X measures ROI — if X is happy with its ROI, it increases its budget hoping to
maintain the same ROI; if it is unhappy, it withdraws.
This behavior is also reflected in the standard industry tools: Google’s AdWords campaign manage-
ment tool buys as much advertising as possible while maintaining a target average CPC and budget
(an average CPC constraint corresponds to an ROI constraint, while a marginal CPC constraint
would be appropriate for profit maximization). Yahoo’s display ad products also offer options
with “CPC goals” and “CPA goals” that buy impressions while aiming to achieve a target average
cost-per-click or cost-per-conversion respectively.
Performance advertisers’ ROI-centric behavior requires comment because it does not maximize
profit. Standard intuition suggests that advertisers who are actively trading off between value
and cost should maximize profit, but it is easy to see that a ROI constraint fails to buy some
profitable ads. One way to resolve this conflict is to conclude that the intuition is wrong, perhaps
since companies often care about revenue and margins as much as profits. Another resolution is
to conclude that ROI is a deeply-ingrained heuristic for maximizing the effectiveness of a fixed
resource, either managing an advertising budget [11, 20, 26, 29, 8] among auctions or between
platforms (deciding how to bid between Yahoo and Google), or even managing resources within
the advertiser’s organization (allocating a budget between marketing and engineering). Regardless,
however, performance advertisers behavior is rarely profit-maximizing.
Advertisers as Value Maximizers We have just seen that advertisers’ objectives fit a simple
paradigm that we call value maximizing: they maximize what they buy (value) subject to spending
constraints. The simplest spending constraint is that the total price does not exceed the total value
of goods purchased. This motivates our minimal theoretical model:4
Definition 1 (Informal). A simple value maximizer maximizes value vi while maintaining budget
balance, i.e. while keeping payment pi ≤ vi; when value is equal, a lower price is preferred.
Surprisingly, this simple model even captures the auction-level preferences of advertisers who
have budget and ROI constraints. Budget constraints can simply be ignored at the auction level
because they are typically orders of magnitude larger than bids. In contrast, ROI constraints have a
substantial effect at the auction level — a value maximizer who requires ROI at least γ will require
vi(o)−pi
pi
≥ γ and thus pi ≤
vi(o)
1+γ — but this looks like a simple value maximizer with a different
value:
3Unconstrained maximization of ROI would likely cause an advertiser to buy only the single cheapest impression
or click available.
4A similar model was discovered independently in concurrent work by Fadaei and Bichler [18]. See related work.
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Observation 1.1 (Informal). If an auction is truthful for simple value maximizers, value maxi-
mizers with ROI constraints will “truthfully” report v′i =
vi
1+γ .
Thus, if one na¨ıvely runs a mechanism that is truthful for value maximizers, bidders with ROI
constraints will simply report v′i =
vi
1+γ , i.e. they report what they are willing to pay (the auctioneer
does not need to know γ, and it does not need to be the same for all bidders). We will discuss
these arguments more formally later.
1.2 Related Work
Aggarwal et al. [4] design sponsored search (slot) auctions in a general matching model. In their
model, each advertiser has a slot-specific value and a slot-specific maximum price; advertisers
maximize profit subject to their maximum price constraints. In the limit where the values are large
they call advertisers maximum price bidders, corresponding directly with our value maximizers,
and observe that GSP is truthful for maximum price bidders. They treat maximum price bidders
as a special corner of the market rather than as a general definition for all advertisers, and they do
not build on their results to justify/interpret GSP.
A limited empirical literature studies the behavior of bidders. Varian [27] tests if bids can be
explained as equilibria for some quasilinear bidders and finds that the errors are not large; this does
not address our situation, though, because assuming bidders are value maximizers would result in
zero error (everyone is simply telling the truth). Athey and Nekipelov [7] presuppose advertisers
have broadly heterogenous objectives and model their behavior.
The idea that agents maximize value is common, though not in mechanism design. For example,
the traditional studies of consumer choice and market equilibria begin with agents who pick the
most-preferred bundle they can afford based on their endowment [21]. In the context of mechanism
design, only a limited literature studies non-quasilinear bidders. Concurrent work by Fadaei and
Bichler introduce a related model of “value bidder” [18], then study a form of revenue maximization.
Our model differs notably because we say bidders prefer lower prices when value is held constant,
while Fadaei and Bichler imply bidders strictly prefer to spend their money. Alaei et al. [5] show how
Walrasian equilibria in non-quasilinear unit-demand settings can be leveraged to build ad auctions
where estimation errors break quasilinearity. A few papers study general truthful mechanisms for
non-quasilinear preferences [2, 23]. These papers develop axiomatic characterizations of a VCG-
analog for multi-unit and unit-demand settings.
A few threads within the qasilinear advertising literature are also related. One line of work
studies the effect of using ROI as a heuristic to set bids across different auctions [11, 20, 26, 29, 8].
Another line of work uses ideas from behavioral economics to capture observed behavior [25].
Finally, a small thread studies GSP and the problem of generalizing it to new contexts. The
canonical analyses of GSP in a quasilinear world are [17, 27]. Attempts to generalize GSP and
consider its performance outside the standard model include [13, 19, 1, 3].
2 Model and Preliminaries
A set of n ads are to be placed on a page according to a configuration (outcome) o ∈ O. For each
configuration, the likelihood that the user clicks on ad i (i’s allocation) is given by xi(o); when the
user clicks, advertiser i pays a price pi.
4
Each advertiser has a private value per click vi and a public
5 complete and transitive preference
i over outcome-price pairs (o, p).
We will reference a few different models of preferences throughout the paper. First, we mention
standard quasilinear preferences:
Definition 2. Preferences are quasi-linear if a bidder prefers to maximize the utility function
ui = (vi − pi)xi, i.e.
(o, pi) i (o
′, p′i)⇔ (vi − pi)xi(o) ≥ (vi − p
′
i)xi(o
′) .
The majority of the paper will focus on value-maximizing preferences in various forms. The
general value-maximizing preferences are defined for arbitrary constraints C.
Definition 3. Preferences are value-maximzing subject to constraints C if they always prefer an
outcome with higher value as long as none of its constraints are violated:
vixi(o) > vixi(o
′) , (o, pi) satisfies C ⇒ (o, pi) ≻i (o
′, p′i) ,
and when the value (allocation) is the same, a lower price is preferred:
xi(o) = xi(o
′) , pi < p
′
i , (o, pi) satisfies C ⇒ (o, pi) ≻i (o
′, p′i) .
Moreover, any outcome is preferred to the one violating C:
(o′, p′i) violates C ⇒ (o, pi) i (o, p
′
i) .
We will primarily work with two specific types of monotone constraints:
Definition 4. A bidder has simple value-maximizing preferences if the bidder is value-maximizing
subject to the constraint that (o, pi) must satisfy pi ≤ vi.
Definition 5. A bidder has value-maximizing preferences with an ROI constraint γ if the bidder
is value-maximizing with the constraint vi−pi
pi
≥ γ.
Auctions and Truthfulness An auction asks bidders to report their value parameters and
specifies, for bids b submitted by the bidders, an outcome f(b) and payments pi(b). The function
f is known as the social choice function and implies an allocation xi(b).
A mechanism is truthful if reporting a bidder’s true private information (e.g. bidding bi = vi)
is a dominant strategy:
Definition 6. A mechanism M = (f,p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if and
only if
∀vi, b, : (f(b−i, vi), pi(b−i, vi)) i (f(b−i, bi), pi(b−i, bi))
In this paper, we will have trouble in continuous bid spaces when truthful bidding would induce
a tie; to solve this we introduce a slight weakening of DSIC that allows arbitrary behavior on a set
of bids that “never occur”:
5We assume this is public for simplicity, but it is not necessary for the results in our paper.
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Definition 7. A mechanism M = (x,p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible almost every-
where (DSIC-AE) if, for any i and bids b−i, we have
(f(b−i, vi), pi(b−i, vi)) i (f(b−i, bi), pi(b−i, bi))
for all value functions vi and deviations bi, except a set of vi with measure zero.
We loosely use truthful to describe either DSIC or DSIC-AE.
Remark 1. Adding a minimum bid increment would eliminate the need for DSIC-AE (the next-
highest bid is always well-defined) at a high cost in readability.
Advertising Slot Auctions and GSP We will use with the standard separable click-through-
rate (CTR) framework used to study sponsored search auctions. In the separable model, the n ads
compete for m slots. There exist (α1, . . . , αm) and (β1, . . . , βn) such that, when ad i is shown in
slot j, the user clicks on it with probability:
Pr[click on ad i when shown in slot j] = αjβi,
The standard GSP auction was originally defined in this setting:
Definition 8. The generalized second price auction (GSP) proceeds as follows:
1. Bidders are sorted by βibi; the bidder ranked j gets slot j.
2. A bidder is charged a price-per-click equal to the minimum bid required to keep the same slot.
3 GSP is Truthful
3.1 Value Maximizers and GSP
We previously argued that advertisers’ objectives are well-modeled by value maximization subject
to a ROI constraint. We also hinted that this was equivalent to our simple value maximizer model,
which we now formalize:
Lemma 1. If a deterministic auction is truthful for simple value maximizers, it will be a dominant
strategy for a value maximizer with value vi and ROI constraint γ to report what it is willing to
pay, v′i =
vi
1+γ .
Remark that we no-longer expect bidders to report vi and instead expect they will report what
they are willing to pay. If we desired a true direct revelation mechanism we could ask bidders to
report γ as well, but in practice it is more natural to report what one is willing to pay than what
something is truly worth.
With this lemma in hand, it remains to show that GSP is truthful for simple value maximizers.
Surprisingly, this is nearly trivial, and was observed by Aggarwal et al. [4] in the context of a
general preference model.6 We sketch a proof from first principles for intuition:
6The proof via [4] observes that value maximizers with ROI constraints can be mapped to their maximum price
bidder model.
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Theorem 1 (Application of Aggarwal et al. [4]). GSP is truthful7 for value maximizers with ROI
constraints, that is, it is a dominant strategy for a bidder to report the maximum price she is willing
to pay.
Sketch. (A rigorous generalization of this proof can be found in Theorem 3.) Note that the GSP
price pi is the minimum bid i could have submitted while maintaining the same rank in the auction.
First, assume that bidders are simple value maximizers. Fix a bidder i and bids b−i. By the
taxation principle, we can think about bidder i choosing among the slots at prices pi,j. Let Vi,j ⊆ ℜ
denote the set of value reports for which i wins slot j under a particular auction.
For a pricing to be truthful for a value maximizer, it should be that i wins a particular slot j
if and only if (a) it is willing to pay pi,j for slot j and (b) is not willing to pay pi,j−1 for the slot
immediately above it. This implies that (a) pj ≤ inf Vi,j and (b) pj−1 ≥ supVi,j−1 and thus
supVi,j+1 ≤ pi,j ≤ inf Vi,j
that is, pi,j is the threshold value (bid) at which i moves from slot j +1 to slot j. This is precisely
the GSP price.
Lemma 1 extends this to value maximizers with an ROI constraint.
3.2 Robustness of Value Maximization
Our next result aims to show that this minimal theoretical model is robust in a practical sense.
Value maximization is intuitively an extreme behavior, so it would be unsurprising if small modeling
changes dramatically changed our results. However, we find that the opposite happens in the
presence of ROI constraints: a sufficient ROI constraint generally makes nearly any advertiser look
like a value maximizer. An example is instructive:
Example 1. Suppose that a bidder has an ROI constraint of 1 and has choices between an outcome
o with value vixi(o) = 1 and an outcome o
′ with value vixi(o
′) = 10. At any price p′ ≤ $9, a profit-
maximizing bidder will prefer o′ to o; however, since bidder i has an ROI constraint of 1, she will
only consider outcome o′ when p′ ≤ $5. As a result, any time o′ is cheap enough for her to consider
it, she will always prefer it to outcome o — in this example, bidder i is effectively a simple value
maximizer with value v′i =
1
2vi.
More generally, when outcomes in an auction lead to dramatically different allocations, a bidder
must pay a very high price before a lesser outcome (lower value) would become preferable. In such
cases, a mild ROI constraint — which caps the price an advertiser is willing to pay — will push a
bidder towards simple value maximizing behavior.
To formalize this, we define a broad class of preference relations that captures everything from
quasilinear to value-maximizing behaviors:
Definition 9. A preference relation ≺i is super-quasilinear if an advertiser who prefers a higher-
value option under quasi-linear preferences also always prefers this option under ≺i, i.e.
vixi(o) ≥ vixi(o
′) and (vi − pi)xi(o) ≥ (vi − p
′
i)xi(o
′)⇔ (o, pi) i (o
′, p′i) .
For super-quasilinear bidders we derive the following condition under which all preferences look
value-maximizing:
7Effectively DSIC-AE (see Definition 7).
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Theorem 2. When bidders have super-quasi-linear preferences ≺i, an ROI constraint γ, and
vixi(o)
γ
γ + 1
≥ vixi(o
′) for all vi, o, o
′ where xi(o) > xi(o
′) ,
no bidder wishes to lie in an auction that is truthful, is individually rational for value maximizers,
and has no positive transfers.8
Proof. Let o and pi be the outcome and price that the bidder sees if it reports truthfully. Let o
′
and p′i be any outcome and price that the bidder can achieve by lying.
First, suppose that xi(o
′) < xi(o), i.e. bidder i is lying to achieve an outcome with a lower
value. Then we can use individual rationality
pi ≤
vi
γ + 1
and we know from no-positive-transfers that p′i ≥ 0. Thus, by the conditions of the theorem, we
know that
(vi − pi)xi(o) ≥ vi
γ
γ + 1
xi(o) > vixi(o
′) ≥ (vi − p
′
i)xi(o
′) .
In words, a profit-maximizing bidder prefers truthful reporting at the maximum individually-
rational price to lying, even if o′ happened for free. Since bidder i has super-profit-maximizing
preferences and vi(o) > vi(o
′), it follows (o, pi) ≻i (o
′, p′i).
Next, suppose that xi(o
′) = xi(o). We know that the mechanism is truthful for value maximizers,
so it must be that pi ≤ p
′
i, otherwise a value maximizer would lie to achieve o
′, p′i. Since any
super-quasilinear bider will prefer a lower price for the same allocation, we can conclude that
(o, pi) i (o
′, p′i).
Finally, suppose that xi(o
′) > xi(o). Since the auction is truthful for value maximizers, we know
that p′i > vi, otherwise a value maximizer would lie to achieve o
′, p′i. By individual rationality
we know that any super-quasilinear bidder prefers (0, 0) an outcome o′ at price p′ > v. Thus,
(o, pi) i (0, 0) ≻i (o
′, p′i), so bidder i will therefore prefer to tell the truth.
3.2.1 Empirical Robustness
To empirically evaluate Theorem 2, we look at Yahoo marketplace data and ask for what ROI
constraint can we safely conclude that any super-quasilinear bidder would behave like a value maxi-
mizer? If we directly apply the theorem to an the separable model we get the following conservative
corollary:
Corollary 1 (of Theorem 2). If αi ≥
γ
γ+1αi+1 for all i in a standard sponsored search auction,
then no bidder with super-quasi-linear preferences and a ROI constraint of γ wishes to lie under
GSP pricing.
This claim gives conditions under which no bidder has an incentive to lie, independent of other
bidders’ bids; however, reality may be even stricter. Given bids, we can ask a simpler question of
whether any bidder could possibly prefer to lie under current marketplace conditions:
8No positive transfers means that the auctioneer never pays the bidders; individual rationality says that every
bidder is at least as happy as if she had not participated at all.
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Lemma 2. When no two bidders have the same score βt, and
∀i,
αi
αi − αi+1
−
αi+1
αi − αi+1
βi+2bi+2
βi+1bi+1
< γ ,
no bidder with super-quasi-linear preferences and a ROI constraint of γ wishes to lie under GSP
pricing.
The proof (omitted) is similar to Theorem 2 and a version can be found in an earlier version of
this work [12].
We tested this lemma empirically by looking at bid data for the slot auctions on Yahoo’s
homepage stream. We took a dataset consisting of over one hundred thousand auctions from a
brief period of time within a single day.
Our results are striking — if bidders require an ROI of 1, then 80% of auctions would be such
that no bidder can benefit by lying under GSP pricing. This strongly suggests that GSP may in
fact be the appropriate auction for this setting. See Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the proportion of auctions in which truthtelling is a best-response for
every advertiser, given the bids of all others, assuming all bidders have a ROI constraint of γ. At
γ = 1, 80% of auctions are such that nobody should lie; as γ approaches 2, virtually all auctions
satisfy Lemma 2. This is derived from a dataset of auctions from Yahoo’s homepage stream, in
which slot advertisements are interspersed in a stream of rich content links.
4 GSP Defined and Generalized
A significant byproduct of our results in Section 3 is that we now have a theoretically justified
axiomatic definition of GSP:
Proposition 1. The generalized second price auction (GSP) is the auction that maximizes expected
bidder value and charges prices truthful for simple value maximizers.
This definition is important because it allows us to soundly extend GSP to new contexts. A small
existing literature has struggled to generalize GSP in the context of quasilinear bidders, generally
finding equilibria may not exist and that even when they do, they may not be efficient [14, 13, 10].
Our work suggests that these negative results are because GSP’s strength was misunderstood.
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Generalizing GSP is an important problem because ads are becoming progressively more com-
plex, and with them the algorithms required to optimize their placement and features. The tra-
ditional separable model is a poor fit for these settings, so GSP does not immediately apply and
the industry has typically moved to a VCG auction due to its purported truthfulness and elegant
implementation. Facebook and Google’s Contextual Ads [28] adopted VCG for precisely these
reasons. However, those implementations of VCG were straightforward because they were largely
from scratch; VCG is a more problematic prescription for established marketplaces like sponsored
search that are currently based on GSP. Advertisers are accustomed to GSP prices, so any switch
will force advertisers to revise their expectations. Moreover, GSP prices are higher than their VCG
counterparts, so to the degree that advertisers do not react, there may be a significant revenue loss
for the advertising platform. A small research thread has explored ways to transition smoothly
from GSP to VCG (e.g. [9]), again assuming bidders maximize profit.
4.1 Single Parameter Generalizations
To generalize GSP we will characterize the allocations that can be implemented truthfully for value
maximizers. In quasilinear settings, it is known that any monotone allocation rule is incentive
compatible [24, 6]; we find that the same is true for value maximizers. This auction has very simple
prices: the prices is the minimum values required to maintain the same allocation x:
Theorem 3. For simple value maximizers in a single parameter domain, a mechanism is truthful
(DSIC-AE) if and only if it is monotone and the price is the minimum value required to get the
same allocation:
• (monotonicity) for any v−i, xi(z, v−i) > xi(v) if and only if z > vi almost everywhere over vi
• (pricing) pi(v) = infz|xi(z,v−i)=xi(v) z
Before we prove our characterization we note an important corollary:
Corollary 2. For any monotone xi, the mechanism that charges pi(v) = infz|xi(z,v−i)=xi(v) z is
DSIC-AE.
This corollary follows because the inf only differs from the min where x is discontinuous, and
a monotone function is continuous almost everywhere (discontinuities are countable and therefore
have measure zero).
of Theorem 3. Fix other bidders’ values v−i and drop them for clarity.
Necessity. Fix a type vi and define
Z< = {z|xi(z) < xi(vi)} and Z
= = {z|xi(z) = xi(vi)}
to be the types that get a strictly smaller allocation than vi and an equal allocation respectively. A
value maximizer with single parameter type vi will choose a bid bi that maximizes xi(bi) subject to
pi(bi) ≤ vi. Thus, for any vi, pi(vi) must be high enough that bidders who get a smaller allocation
do not want to lie, i.e.
pi(vi) ≥ pi , supZ
< .
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Similarly, all types who exactly get xi(vi) must pay the same price, and it must be that any bidder
who gets xi(vi) must be willing to pay for it, so
pi(vi) ≤ pi = inf Z
= .
Since supZ< ≥ inf Z=, it must be that p
i
≥ pi, and therefore to satisfy pi ≤ pi(vi) ≤ pi a
mechanism will be truthful if and only if p
i
= pi = pi(vi) — this happens if and only if x is
nondecreasing and is the price defined in the theorem.
Sufficiency. Note that for DSIC-AE we only need to prove sufficiency almost everywhere. We
must consider three deviations: (1) a bidder underbids for a smaller allocation, (2) a bidder deviates
for the same allocation at a lower price, and (3) a bidder overbids for a larger allocation. Remark
that deviation (1) will not happen because a value maximizer will always want the larger allocation
(since pi(vi) ≤ vi by definition of pi), and that (2) cannot happen because all types who get the
same allocation pay the same price.
It remains to show that bidders almost never have an incentive to raise a bid (3). Deviation
(3) will only be beneficial if there exists a type z > vi such that xi(z) > xi(vi) but pi(z) < vi. By
definition of pi, there exists a type bi(z) ≥ vi such that
pi(z) = bi(z) .
As long as bi(z) > vi this deviation cannot be beneficial. Unfortunately, when bi(z) = vi then
deviation (3) will be beneficial; however, this can only happen at a discontinuity in x. Since x
is monotone, discontinuities can only happen rarely (the set of discontinuities is countable and
therefore has measure 0) and we get truthfulness in our almost-everywhere sense (DSIC-AE).
4.2 Substantiating GSP’s Folk Definition
While we have given the first rigorous axiomatic definition of GSP, the following folk description
is well-known:
Proposition 2 (Folklore). GSP is the auction that maximizes expected bidder value and charges
the minimum bid required to keep the same allocation.
Until now, this definition was merely a pleasant-sounding heuristic for general auction settings;
however, our work gives this definition theoretical teeth:
Observation 4.1. The folklore definition of GSP is equivalent to the truthful auction for value
maximizers defined in Theorem 3.
By consequence, this folklore definition is also equivalent to Proposition 1, closing the loop on
defining GSP.
5 Conclusion
Our work paints GSP as a sound, practical, and elegant auction, nearly perfectly suited to the
online advertising auctions it serves. Yet, it is undeniable that rejecting profit as an objective
goes against the grain. Lest one finds earlier arguments unconvincing, we offer one concluding
observation: advertisers measure average costs, not marginal costs. Every dashboard, spreadsheet,
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and presentation we have seen in practice starts by measuring performance in terms of the average
cost per click, average value, and so on. Comparing averages measures ROI, not profit.
In light of our work, GSP almost appears as a happy coincidence. It wasn’t designed to be
truthful — it wasn’t even designed by auction experts as far as we know — but it turned out to be
a smashing success. Yet, perhaps GSP’s original designer(s) had instinct that naturally led them
to GSP, or perhaps in their na¨ıvety they thought more like advertisers an auction expert would.
This leaves a quiet, nagging question: what of that instinct might we still be missing?
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